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Cardozo and some that examine facets of his career in greater 
depth, but probably none as consistently stimulating as this one. 
THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER 
COURT IN ACTION. By Bernard Schwartz.! Reading, 
Ma.: Addison-Wesley. 1990. Pp. x, 413. $24.95. 
Herbert Hovenkamp 2 
This well organized, instructive volume is sure to be an impor-
tant addition to anyone's collection of Supreme Court history. Pro-
fessor Bernard Schwartz seeks to capture the entire constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Burger Court (1969-1986). In addition to the 
published record, the book is based on numerous oral interviews 
with both Justices and former law clerks, conference notes and 
docket books, correspondence, and earlier drafts of opinions. The 
result is a great deal of information about the workings of the 
Supreme Court by a lawyer who has a keen understanding of the 
Court as an institution, and of the meaning and significance of its 
internal disputes. This book gives a much more balanced view than 
earlier books (such as The Brethren) based on similar material. It 
reveals a bitterly divided Court, an ineffectual Chief Justice who 
inadvertently transferred great power to ideological opponents, 
such as Justice Brennan, and a gradual change from a cohesive 
Bench to a group of nine quite independent Justices, working alone 
to a greater degree than ever before, at least in the twentieth 
century. 
Except for the first two chapters and the last, Professor 
Schwartz's study is organized entirely by subject matter, with a dis-
proportionately large percentage devoted to the Bill of Rights. For 
example, there are three chapters, totalling nearly one hundred 
pages, on the first amendment; but only one chapter of thirty pages 
on the combined subjects of the new federalism and the commerce 
clause. Equal protection claims three chapters and criminal proce-
dure two. Separation of powers and presidential power are com-
bined in a single chapter. 
President Nixon's appointment of Burger was part of an effort 
to unravel the jurisprudence of the Warren Court. A theme that 
runs throughout this book is that Nixon picked the wrong man for 
the job. Perhaps because of his disdain for the federal judiciary in 
I. Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University Law School. 
2. Ben V. and Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
1991] BOOK REVIEWS 513 
general, Nixon neglected to select a person who had the stature of 
either Warren or, for that matter, most of the other Justices on the 
Court. 
Schwartz is clearly no admirer of Burger as an intellectual or 
as a judicial craftsman. He opines that most of Burger's colleagues 
could run "intellectual rings" around him, and that he was a notori-
ously bad opinion writer. In some cases he managed to lose his own 
previously committed majority because those who had voted with 
him could not agree with his written opinion. In fact, in the Nixon 
case the Chief Justice, who had assigned the opinion to himself, 
bungled the job so badly that several Justices decided to begin circu-
lating their own drafts of various sections in order to help him out. 
The result was a rambling, repetitive opinion written by a commit-
tee of Justices. 
The Burger Court, Schwartz concludes, will be most 
remembered for Burger's poor intellectual leadership and manage-
rial skills. "It can indeed be said," Schwartz concludes, "that no 
important Warren Court decision was overruled during the Burger 
tenure," although a few were narrowed. To the extent it is 
remembered for its substantive decisions, those who moved the 
Court to the left are at least as significant as those who moved it to 
the right. There was, for example, Roe v. Wade, which guaranteed 
a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion; and Goldberg v. 
Kelly, which held that welfare payments could not be terminated 
without notice and a pre-termination hearing. In the area of free-
dom of speech, the Burger Court was the first to recognize broad 
constitutional protection for commercial speech. An important af-
termath: the Chief Justice was led kicking and screaming through a 
decision process that ended up banning most restrictions on truthful 
lawyer advertising. 
Chief Justice Burger, it was widely hoped, would reduce the 
procedural rights of accused criminals that were so greatly ex-
panded during the Warren period-particularly in Gideon, Mapp, 
and Miranda. In fact, not only were none of these decisions over-
ruled, they were for the most part expanded during Burger's tenure. 
Likewise, in the area of race relations, Brown v. Board of Education 
was expanded so as to fashion a remedy of federally enforced school 
busing in districts where segregation had been enforced by law. 
Perhaps the greatest "conservative" success of the Burger 
Court was National League of Cities v. Usery, a model of the new 
federalism, which exempted local governments from some federal 
legislation passed under the Commerce power. National League it-
self was a highly creative, noninterpretivist decision which seemed 
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to run contrary to Burger's own professed principles of judicial re-
straint. But Burger was never able to form much of a consensus for 
National League, and the Court took every subsequent opportunity 
to narrow its scope. This great edifice of the new federalism was 
overruled before Burger's tenure had even come to an end. 
A second, more enduring accomplishment was the abolition of 
an old administrative law distinction between rights and privileges, 
and the substitution of a doctrine of "entitlement." An entitlement 
was a statutory right from the government that could not be taken 
away without a certain amount of due process. However, entitle-
ments were not fundamental constitutional rights, such that any 
state deprivation was subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Dandridge 
v. Williams (1970) held that there was no fundamental right towel-
fare payments-although taking welfare payments from someone 
already receiving them required procedural safeguards. San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973) held that 
there was no fundamental right to an education. 
A related accomplishment, to which Schwartz gives short 
treatment, is the increased use of the language of cost-benefit analy-
sis in determining the minimum scope of due process in administra-
tive hearings. The Warren Court tended to regard any kind of due 
process protection, once recognized at all, as more nearly absolute. 
The Burger Court was much more willing to balance costs against 
benefits. This type of analysis, Schwartz notes, was itself probably 
necessitated by Goldberg v. Kelly, which produced an "explosion" 
of due process cases involving termination of benefits, public em-
ployment, and other areas of public decision making. As Schwartz 
notes, the number of decisions affecting individual benefits made by 
regulatory agencies under statutes such as the Social Security Act 
probably number in the millions. "A full trial in every such case 
would make the system unworkable." In order to resolve this prob-
lem the Court attempted to weigh the anticipated benefits of any 
additional procedural protection against its anticipated costs. A 
good example is Ingraham v. Wright (1977), which decided that no-
tice and a hearing were not necessary before the imposition of cor-
poral punishment in public schools. The entire line of cases has 
been attacked by liberals as attempting to quantify something to 
which such numbers cannot be easily attached. But more than any-
thing else, the decisions reveal the awesome impact of Goldberg v. 
Kelly on our notion of the appropriate scope of procedural due 
process. 
In a way, the title of this book seems inapt. "The Ascent of 
Pragmatism" suggests a particular view of the role of the Supreme 
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Court, and someone who was successful in achieving it. What 
Schwartz ends up describing, however, is a weak, ineffectual Chief 
Justice, unable to give effect to his own ideological views and, for 
the most part, unable to ride herd on his Court. As a result, the 
sharp tum to the right from Warren Era liberalism, which both 
President Nixon and Burger himself envisioned, never materialized. 
In many areas the Burger Court kept Warren policies alive through 
sheer inertia, while in others the Court actually moved further to 
the left. The turns to the right were haphazard, unpredictable, and 
reflected no consistent ideology. This was not an ascent of pragma-
tism; it was a collapse of leadership. "I don't think that the Burger 
Court has as wide a sense of mission," Schwartz quotes then Asso-
ciate Justice Rehnquist as saying, in comparing the Burger and 
Warren Courts. "Perhaps it doesn't have any sense of mission at 
all." Schwartz concludes that Roe v. Wade was the "paradigmatic" 
Burger Court decision-because it reveals a thrashing group, with 
even those in agreement as to outcome unable to form a consensus 
on the reasoning. 
CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICf AND CONSEN-
SUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. By 
Calvin C. Jillson.t New York: Agathon Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 
242. Hardcover, $30.00; Paperback, $15.00. 
Richard S. Kay 2 
In this book Professor Calvin Jillson, a political scientist, has 
sought to cast new light on the much-studied process of decision-
making at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. It is an interesting 
attempt to apply modem techniques of quantitative social science 
·research to the archival evidence of the Convention's proceedings. 
While this is an admirable and promising enterprise, in the end the 
illumination shed by the data examined proves disappointingly 
limited. 
In one sense, Professor Jillson is attempting to complicate what 
he takes to be oversimplified explanations in the existing literature. 
He reads previous analysts as falling into two categories, each con-
centrating on a limited and partial approach to the Convention. 
One group (Charles Beard and Forrest McDonald are exemplary) 
I. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, 
Boulder. 
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